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Structural Change out of Agriculture: 
Labor Push versus Labor Pull
*
 
The process of economic development is characterized by substantial rural-urban migrations 
and a decreasing share of agriculture in output and employment. The literature highlights two 
main engines behind this process of structural change: (i) improvements in agricultural 
technology combined with the effect of Engel’s law of demand push resources out of the 
agricultural sector (the “labor push” hypothesis), and (ii) improvements in industrial 
technology attract labor into this sector (the “labor pull” hypothesis). We present a simple 
model that features both channels and use it to explore their relative importance. We 
evaluate the U.S. time series since 1800 and a sample of 13 industrialized countries starting 
in the 19th century. Our results suggest that, on average, the “labor pull” channel dominates. 
This contrasts with popular modeling choices in the recent literature. 
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1 Introduction
The process of economic development is always and everywhere characterized by substan-
tial reallocations of resources out of agriculture. While most economists agree that this
structural transformation has been driven by productivity increases, there is no consensus
on whether technological progress in manufacturing or in agriculture has been more im-
portant. Yet, given the continuing importance of the agricultural sector in today’s poor
economies, it is crucial to have a proper understanding of the historical determinants of
structural change. To address this, we propose a simple model that encompasses both
sources of structural change to show how to identify their relative importance in the data.
We use this model to explore the historical experience of 13 countries that have completed
their process of structural reallocation, using data from the 19th century onwards.1
Already Clark (1940), Kuznets (1966) and Chenery and Syrquin (1975) documented
the process of structural transformation: the fall in the share of agriculture in output and
employment that accompanied long-run increases in income per capita. As an example, in
1800, the U.S. economy employed around three fourths of its labor force in the agricultural
sector. The sector accounted for more than half of total output. Two hundred years
later, only 2.5% of the labor force remained in the agricultural sector and the share of
agricultural production in GDP was below 1%. Over these two centuries, U.S. output per
capita increased more than 25 times.
Although development economists and economic historians have long been interested
in this process of structural transformation, there has been and still is substantial debate
about the relative roles technological progress in the agricultural and the manufacturing
sectors played in the process, with classical and more recent contributions on both sides.
On the one hand, there is a continuing tradition that places the emphasis of the
transformation on the manufacturing sector. Lewis (1954) presents a model where capital
accumulation in the modern sector raises urban wages and attracts surplus labor from the
1In this paper, we use the term “structural change” in a narrow sense to refer exclusively to movements
of resources out of the agricultural sector. Moreover, to keep the prose simple, we will use the terms
“modern sector” and “manufacturing sector” to refer to the entire non-agricultural sector.
2agricultural sector. Reinvestment of proﬁts keeps the process going. Similarly, Harris and
Todaro (1970) present a two sector model in which rural-urban migration results from
positive diﬀerences between the expected urban (industrial) real income and agricultural
product per worker. Both theories suggest that technological progress and investment in
manufacturing raise urban incomes and drive the process of structural change. In this
view, increasing industrial wages attract low-paid or underemployed labor from agriculture
into manufacturing. Following Gylfason and Zoega (2006) we refer to this as the “labor
pull” hypothesis. Hansen and Prescott (2002) model a similar mechanism and conclude
that “the (modern) technology must improve suﬃciently so that it ultimately becomes
proﬁtable to shift resources into this sector”.
On the other hand, some scholars consider agricultural productivity the main driver
of structural change. Nurkse (1953) argues that “everyone knows that the spectacular
industrial revolution would not have been possible without the agricultural revolution
that preceded it”. Rostow (1960) identiﬁes increases in agricultural productivity as a
necessary condition for a successful take-oﬀ. These authors suggest that improvements in
agricultural technology allow solving the “food problem” (Schultz 1953), so that resources
can be released from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector. We refer to this as
the “labor push” hypothesis. Recently, Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002, 2007) provide
a modern formalization of these ideas. In their words, “improvements in agricultural
productivity can hasten the start of industrialization and, hence, have large eﬀects on a
country’s relative income. A key implication of the model is that growth in agricultural
productivity is central to development.” Productivity growth in agriculture also acts as
the main driver of the structural transformation in Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
Our objective is to provide empirical evidence on the relative importance of the “push”
and “pull” hypotheses. We present a simple model close to Matsuyama (1992) and to
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) that is consistent with the two crucial observations
associated with the process of structural change: a secular decline in the share of the
labor force devoted to agriculture and a decreasing weight of agricultural output in na-
tional product. Our model captures both sources of structural change highlighted in the
literature: improvements in agricultural technology combined with Engel’s law of demand
shift resources to the industrial sector, and improvements in manufacturing technology
increase manufacturing wages, pulling labor into that sector. We use this framework
to assess the eﬀects of increases in agricultural and manufacturing productivity on key
3observable variables. Both hypotheses lead to qualitatively similar behavior of labor allo-
cations, the share of agriculture in GDP, and wages. They diﬀer in their predictions for
the evolution of the relative price of manufactures relative to agricultural goods. Hence,
data on the relative price allow identifying which sector is the main engine of the struc-
tural transformation. In this sense, our exercise follows a long tradition in economics
that uses changes in relative prices to infer changes in productivity. A recent example is
Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997).
We then explore the determinants of structural change using data on relative prices
and on agricultural labor shares in two samples: the U.S. time series since 1800 and a
long panel of 13 industrialized countries starting in the 19th century. Since for the U.S.,
estimates of sectoral productivities are available, the ﬁrst exercise allows us to conﬁrm the
validity of our basic identifying strategy. In line with the model predictions, the relative
price is almost a mirror image of relative productivity. For the larger sample, not all of
the data required to compute sectoral productivities is available. In these circumstances,
our parsimonious approach that relies on the relative price provides important insights
that could not be obtained otherwise.
There are three main ﬁndings. Firstly, there is a lot of heterogeneity; both channels
play a role. For instance, in the case of the U.S. it is very clear that the “labor pull”
channel dominated before World War I, with the “labor push” channel taking over after
World War II (this period has also been dubbed the Green Revolution). Secondly, on
average, increases in non-agricultural productivity slightly outpaced those in agricultural
productivity, pointing to the “labor pull” channel as a somewhat more important driver of
structural change overall. Finally, we ﬁnd that the decline in the agricultural labor share
is larger when the productivity of manufacturing increases relative to that of agriculture
than the other way round. This holds at all stages of the structural transformation.
The main contribution of our paper hence is to provide insights about the histori-
cally important drivers of structural change. Our results have important implications for
modeling that process. In particular, models of structural change that rely on faster pro-
ductivity growth in agriculture such as Ngai and Pissarides (2007) seem to be at odds with
most of the the pre-World War II evidence. Moreover, models of structural change that
restrict non-homotheticities in preferences to food consumption, such as Gollin, Parente
and Rogerson (2002), seem to miss non-agricultural technological progress as an impor-
tant driver of structural change. As a consequence, our results cast some doubt on some of
4the estimates and policy recommendations derived using modeling strategies that neglect
the crucial role played by non-agricultural productivity in the process of structural change
and economic development. Given the continuing importance of the agricultural sector in
today’s poor economies and its impact on aggregate productivity diﬀerences documented
by Caselli (2005), Temple and Woessmann (2006) and Restuccia, Yang and Zhu (2008),
among others, it is crucial to have a proper understanding of the historical determinants
of structural change.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and explores
the implications of increases in agricultural and manufacturing productivity. Section 3
evaluates our model against the U.S. experience. Section 4 explores the determinants
of structural change in a long panel of 13 industrialized countries. The conclusions are
summarized in Section 5, while the Appendices provide some technical details and data
descriptions.
2 Agricultural Push vs. Industrial Pull in a simple model
of structural change
We consider a closed economy that consists of two sectors: a traditional sector devoted
to the production of agricultural goods and a modern sector that produces industrial
commodities and services. The size of the labor force is constant and normalized to 1.
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t are the amounts of labor employed in manufacturing and in
agriculture respectively, and M and A denote the levels of technology in the two sectors.
For the moment, we assume that both technology parameters are constant.
As in Matsuyama (1992), labor can move freely across sectors. Then, competition
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Consumers are identical, inﬁnitely lived, and inelastically supply their labor endow-
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where cA
t and cM
t denote individual consumption of food and manufactures, respectively,
and  the relative weight of food in preferences. These preferences are non-homothetic
for two reasons. First, we introduce a subsistence level of food consumption, . As
a result, the income elasticity of food demand is below one, in line with the evidence
on the universality of Engel’s law known at least since Houthakker (1957). This fea-
ture of preferences has long been emphasized in the literature on sectoral reallocation
(Matsuyama 1992, Laitner 2000, Caselli and Coleman 2001, Gollin et al. 2002). Sec-
ond, we assume that the income elasticity of non-agricultural goods is greater than one.
Following Kongsamut et al. (2001) we can interpret  as an exogenous endowment of
non-agricultural goods, possibly resulting from home production.3 Finally, we assume
that the level of agricultural productivity is high enough so that our economy operates
above the subsistence level of food,
AG(1) > : (3)
2The extent of integration of the rural labor market with the rest of the economy is a topic of debate.
While some development economists argue that it is low, Magnac and Postel-Vinay (1997) provide evi-
dence from 19th century France that “migration between industry and agriculture was quite sensitive to
relative wages in the two sectors” and that ﬁrms took this into account in their decisions. They also ﬁnd
that wages were similar in the two sectors. Moreover, our qualitative results are robust to the introduction
of quadratic migration costs à la Krugman (1991).
3For instance, clothes can be washed using a washing machine (a component of cM) or by hand (home
production). Our speciﬁcation can thus be interpreted as modeling home production in reduced form,
similar to Kongsamut et al. (2001) and Duarte and Restuccia (2010). In Appendix A, we introduce a
generalized CES speciﬁcation that yields identical results when  = 0. Nonetheless we believe that our
exposition is clearer under (2).
6The representative household chooses his consumption bundle to maximize the present
value of (2), discounted at a rate  > 0, subject to the budget constraint
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t represents time spent working in the modern sector.4 Together with (4), the









where  is the shadow value of an additional unit of income. Optimizing households equate
the marginal rate of substitution between the two consumption goods to the relative price.
Combining these two equations, the individual demand for the agricultural good satisﬁes
cA
t =  + pt(cM
t + ). Aggregating across households and using upper case letters for
aggregate variables, this becomes
C
A
t =  + pt(C
M
t + ): (5)
In equilibrium, all output from both sectors is consumed, so CA
t = Y A
t and CM
t = Y M
t .
Combining the market clearing condition with (1) and (5) yields the following relation for
the allocation of labor between sectors.
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where x denotes the partial derivative of  with respect to the variable x. Given (3),
equation (6) has a unique solution that determines the level of employment in the non-
agricultural sector.
To obtain the eﬀect of productivity increases on the sectoral allocation, diﬀerentiate
















4Since we abstract from capital accumulation, our problem is simply a sequence of static problems.
7where equilibrium choices are denoted by . Productivity increases in either sector lead
to ﬂows of labor out of agriculture. Our model thus captures the two engines behind the
large reallocation of labor out of agriculture that were highlighted in the introduction.
As in Matsuyama (1992) and Gollin et al. (2002), increases in the level of agricultural
productivity push labor out of the agricultural sector: the “labor push” eﬀect discussed by
Nurkse (1953) and Rostow (1960). But additionally, as in Hansen and Prescott (2002),
improvements in the level of technology in the industrial sector pull labor out of the
traditional sector, increasing manufacturing employment: the “labor pull” eﬀect stressed
by Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970). The income elasticities of demand for
agricultural and non-agricultural commodities lie behind these two eﬀects. Notice that
if  = 0 the labor allocation is independent of the level of agricultural technology and if
 = 0 the labor allocation is independent of the level of technology in the non-agricultural
sector.
Our model is also consistent with the second stylized fact of structural change, the
















This expression increases in LM
t , the share of labor employed in non-agricultural produc-
tion. Hence, increases in productivity in either sector reduce the share of agriculture not
only in employment but also in output.
Finally, we can evaluate the eﬀects of technological change on the relative price of
manufactures. Using (1), (5), (7) and (8), we ﬁnd the following comparative statics






























We can use this simple framework with only labor and costless reallocation between
sectors to explore the empirical implications of the labor-push and labor-pull hypotheses.
Both hypotheses are associated with migrations from the countryside to the manufacturing
8centers and with a declining weight of agriculture in national product. Furthermore, both
hypotheses are associated with increases in rural and urban wages. But while increases in
agricultural productivity, A, are associated with increases in the relative price of the non-
agricultural good, increases in the level of productivity in the modern sector, M, reduce
the relative price of non-agricultural goods. Thus, while the evolution of wages, labor
allocations or sector output shares provides little information to discriminate between
the two hypotheses, the behavior of relative prices gives crucial insights about the relative
roles of the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution in the process of structural
change that started in Britain more than two centuries ago. In this sense, our exercise
follows a long tradition in economics that uses changes in relative prices to infer changes
in productivity. A recent example is Greenwood et al. (1997).
Finally, we turn to explore the implications of our model in the presence of continuous
technological change in both sectors, most likely the empirically relevant case. Denoting
the instantaneous growth rates of agricultural and non-agricultural productivity by ^ A > 0
and ^ M > 0, respectively, and denoting the change in the share of labor in manufactures
by _ LM, we use (1) to reach the following expression for the growth rate of the relative
price.
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As long as there is no technological regress, the last inequality holds. This inequality
implies that decreases in the relative price of manufactures are unambiguously associated
with faster technological change in the non-agricultural sector, i.e. they indicate that the
“labor pull” eﬀect dominates. If the relative price rises, the situation is less clear. An
equal increase in both sectors’ productivities induces an increase in the relative price of
manufactures, resulting from the low income elasticity of demand for food and the high
income elasticity of demand for manufactures. So only a strong increase in the relative
price is a sign of stronger growth in agricultural productivity, or “labor push”. A weak
increase in the relative price can well occur in a situation where the productivity in
manufacturing has increased by slightly more.5
5Finally, it is worth noticing that in the presence of international trade, the labor allocation decision
is independent of the consumption decision. A small open economy takes the relative price as given
and, assuming that labor is mobile across sectors but immobile across countries, the domestic labor
allocation is uniquely determined by (1). Given the world relative price, an increase in agricultural
productivity then induces a shift of resources to agriculture, the now more productive sector. Increases in
manufacturing productivity “pull” labor out of the agricultural sector leading to similar but more intense
9In the next two sections, we exploit the implications of our model to explore the sources
of structural change using two centuries of U.S. data and a long panel of 13 countries that
already completed the process of structural transformation.
3 A long-term view of structural change in the U.S.
Although large migrations out of the agriculture began in the UK more than two centuries
ago, the U.S. was one of the ﬁrst countries to complete this process of structural trans-
formation. Furthermore, the wealth and quality of the U.S. data, which besides relative
prices includes data on sectoral productivities, makes this country an ideal candidate to
evaluate the basic prediction of our model that changes in the relative price reﬂect changes
in relative productivity. In particular, equation (9) implies that if the relative price falls,
it must be that productivity in the non-agricultural sector has increased at a faster pace
than agricultural productivity.
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the share of employment in agriculture and the
relative price of manufactures to agricultural goods for the U.S. from 1800 to 2000. Over
these two centuries, the share of labor employed in agriculture declined from 73% to
barely 2.5%. This decline was monotonic, except for the period of the Great Depression.6
In contrast, the relative price declined steadily until 1918, then became more volatile
until the end of World War II, after which it went on an upward trend. Our model then
identiﬁes a change in the main driver behind the process of structural transformation after
World War II: the labor pull eﬀect dominates before the war, with the labor push eﬀect
taking over later on. This implies that non-agricultural productivity growth outpaced its
agricultural counterpart from the beginning of our sample period to World War I, with
roles reversing after World War II.
This prediction is consistent with existing estimates of farm and non-farm productivity
migrations than in the closed economy scenario. See Matsuyama (1992, 2009) for speciﬁc details on the
open economy scenario. However, footnote 10 provides evidence that the closed economy assumption
seems more appropriate for our sample.
6Only recently have real business cycles scholars made an attempt to explain the Great Depression in
terms of fully speciﬁed stochastic general equilibrium models, see Prescott (1999) and Cole and Ohanian
(1999, 2002). Their estimates suggest a 14% drop in TFP between 1929 and 1934. In the context of
the model outlined in the previous section, a drop in TFP in any sector will trigger a process of reverse
migration similar to the one observed in the data.
10Figure 1: The share of employment in agricultural and the relative price of manufactures





















































































































Sources: See Table 5.
in the U.S..7 Figure 2 plots the relative price of manufactures to agricultural goods and
the relative productivity in the two sectors. Productivity is almost a mirror image of the
price. In particular, it is striking to see that while the average growth rate in the non-farm
sector outstrips that in the farm sector by 1% over the period from 1820 to 1948, the trend
strongly reverses for the 1948 to 2002 period: in the second half of the twentieth century,
average yearly TFP growth in the non-farm sector is 1.4%, compared to 1.7% in the farm
sector. Not surprisingly this latter period, characterized by the rapid adoption of new
agricultural technologies, has been known as the period of the “Green Revolution”. For
instance, after World War II, the adoption rates of tractors and of hybrid corn increased
rapidly (Griliches 1957, Olmstead and Rhode 2001), contributing to rapid productivity
growth in agriculture. More importantly, the results of this comparison are consistent
with the basic prediction of our model and give us conﬁdence to extend our identiﬁcation
strategy based on relative price data to a larger sample of countries where data on sectoral
productivity is not readily available.
7See notes to the ﬁgure for sources.















































































































































Sources: U.S. farm productivity is from Gallman (1972, Table 7) for 1800-1840, from Craig and Weiss
(2000, Table 3) for 1840-1870 (both cited in Dennis and Iscan 2009), from Kendrick (1961, Table B-
I) for 1869-1948, and from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research
Service, Agricultural Productivity Data Set, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgProductivity/, for
1948-2000. Non-farm productivity is from Sokoloﬀ (1986, Table 13.9) for 1820-1860 (again cited in
Dennis and Iscan 2009), from Kendrick (1961, Table A-XXIII) for 1870-1948, and from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) Multifactor Productivity Trends – Historical SIC Measures 1948-2002, http:
//www.bls.gov/mfp/historicalsic.htm, for 1948-2000.
4 Historical evidence from some successful transform-
ers
Is the U.S. experience representative? To answer this question, we gather data on labor
allocations and relative prices for a sample of 13 countries that have completed their
process of sectoral reallocation by the end of the twentieth century. Besides this, data
availability determines whether a country is included in our sample.
In contrast to the use of relative productivity series, the use of the relative price has
several advantages in terms of data requirements and functional form restrictions. First,
the relative price strategy is less demanding in terms of data, giving us more and longer
12series to work with. Computing TFP is a data intensive exercise that, besides the data
on labor allocations and prices that we use, requires data on output, other inputs and
factor shares. In most cases, these other series are not available. They are also harder to
measure and therefore likely less reliable than the data we use. Second, by using relative
prices we avoid imposing the stronger restrictions on the production function required to
obtain TFP estimates. Finally, our empirical exercise will go beyond the simple inspection
of the evolution of the relative price and will attempt to explore the extent to which the
labor reallocation responds to changes in relative price to uncover the relative importance
of labor push and labor pull in the process of structural change.
4.1 Data sources and overview
Our sample consists of 13 countries that have completed the process of structural transfor-
mation by the end of the twentieth century and for which we have data on labor allocations
and relative prices. For many of these countries, data is available starting in the 19th
century. While the number of countries in our sample is not large, the series cover a long
span of time, giving a complete picture of the process of structural transformation in these
countries. Details on coverage and sources are summarized in Tables 5 and 6 in Appendix
B. To abstract from short-run ﬂuctuations and to make ﬁgures comparable across data
sources, we use ﬁve-year moving averages of both variables where data is available at a
higher frequency.8
Figure 3 shows the time paths of the labor share in agriculture for the countries in
our sample. The panels group countries with similar experiences. For the U.S., Finland,
Sweden, and Japan, our data covers essentially the whole process of structural change,
with initial agricultural labor shares in the neighborhood of 80%. For the remaining
countries in our sample (UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Spain, and South Korea) the period covered is shorter, but on average our data still
captures reallocations that aﬀect more than 25% of the labor force.
As emphasized by the model, the historical evidence suggests that structural change
8For some countries where no measure of the price of manufacturing goods is available, we use the GDP
deﬂator relative to the price of agricultural goods. Appendix C shows that this measure changes with
changes in relative productivity in the same way as the relative price p does. We focus on manufacturing
because this is where resources moved from agriculture. The share of the labor force in services only
started to increase when the agricultural share of output was already below 5%, as Buera and Kaboski






























































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: The employment share of agriculture
is a one-way street. Increases in the labor share in agriculture are extremely rare events.
Clearly, the UK (top left panel) was the ﬁrst country to experience substantial structural
change, with a labor share in agriculture below 50% as early as 1800. At that time,
the U.S. agricultural share was still above 75%. Countries that started the process of
structural change later tended to experience a faster pace of migrations. The diﬀerence in
the speed of change is particularly clear when comparing the European early starters in
the top right panel to the European late starters in the bottom left panel. When the latter
started their transformations, the former already had very low labor shares in agriculture.
Nonetheless, the late starters experienced much faster reallocations and nowadays their
agricultural labor shares are not far from those of the earlier starters. The fastest change
was experienced by South Korea and Japan.
Similar patterns emerge from the descriptive statistics summarized in Table 1. While
14Table 1: Descriptive statistics: structural change
Average annual change in share of employment in agriculture
whole sample up to 1939 after 1939 after 1939 while LA > 0:1
(countries with
pre-1939 data)
mean change -0.434 -0.320 -0.645 -0.530 -0.465
(% pts) (0.456) (0.382) (0.508) (0.376) (0.484)
mean rate of -1.847 -0.796 -3.788 -3.575 -1.502
change (%) (1.908) (0.803) (1.835) (1.716) (1.723)
fraction < 0 0.959 0.938 1.000 1.000 0.952
observations 148 96 52 44 125
countries 13 12 8 7 13
Notes: Computed using 5-year moving averages of the variables for period where both price and labor
share data is available. Standard errors in parentheses. The mean rate of change is the mean annualized
% change. The mean change is in percentage points.
the standard deviation in the pooled data is substantial, virtually all episodes consist
of migrations out of agriculture. On average over the whole sample, the agricultural
labor share has dropped by 0.4 percentage points per year. This translates into a rate of
decline of that share of 1.8% per year. At this rate it takes around 60 years to reduce
the agricultural labor share from 60%, the average labor share at the beginning of our
sample, to 20%. Structural change was slower before World War II (average annual
change of -0.3 percentage points or a rate of change of -0.8%) and faster afterwards (-0.6
percentage points or -3.8%). This tendency holds even when we restrict our sample to
those industrialized countries for which pre-war data is available.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 2 present the average annual change and the average
annual growth rate of the labor share in agriculture at the country level. It is clear that
the variation across countries is substantial. While part of this is due to diﬀerences in
data coverage across countries, most of it remains when computing the same statistics for
smaller, balanced panels.9 As was already evident in Figure 1, the late starters, perhaps
9In constructing balanced panels, there is a tradeoﬀ between the number of countries and the overall
number of observations that can be included. The most encompassing balanced panels cover seven
countries over either 1860 to 1900 or 1890 to 1930. Clearly, the unbalanced panel with its much larger
coverage is much more informative. In the 1860-1900 balanced panel, there is about half as much cross-
15Table 2: Descriptive statistics for historical data: Structural change and the change in
the relative price of manufactures by country
country dLA g(LA) g(p) data coverage
(% pts) (%) (%)
Belgium -0.38 -1.40 -0.26 1846 - 1946
Canada -0.50 -2.59 -0.10 1890 - 1970
Finland -0.55 -2.08 -0.22 1880 - 2000
France -0.20 -0.42 -0.33 1856 - 1911
Germany -0.29 -0.69 -0.69 1871 - 1907
Italy -0.14 -0.24 0.34 1871 - 1911
Japan (1880-1930) -0.66 -1.02 -0.40 1880 - 1930
(1960-1990) -0.84 -4.88 -2.42 1960 - 1990
Netherlands -0.14 -0.38 -0.69 1820 - 1910
South Korea -1.28 -4.84 -3.25 1965 - 2005
Spain -0.23 -0.40 -0.15 1860 - 1950
Sweden -0.48 -2.08 0.12 1850 - 2000
UK -0.29 -1.48 0.20 1820 - 1900
USA -0.38 -1.85 0.25 1820 - 1999
Notes: Computed using 5-year moving averages of the variables for period where both price and labor
share data is available. All changes are annualized. For Japan, there are only two disjoint series for the
relative price, so we treat the two periods separately. d denotes a diﬀerence, g() a growth rate.
with the exception of Spain and Italy, experienced the fastest rates of structural change
while France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands had a much slower, drawn-out process.
4.2 The relative price and structural change
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for changes in the relative price of manufactures. The
average change in the relative price is slightly negative, an average decrease of less than
one third of a percentage point per year. Around half of the observations fall on each
side of zero, with a substantial standard deviation. For all countries taken together, the
relative price declines more quickly after World War II. Here, however, sample composition
country variation in structural change as in the unbalanced one, while in the 1890-1930 one, there is
almost as much as in the unbalanced panel.
16matters. Considering only those countries for which we also have data for the period
before 1939, a pattern similar to that observed in the U.S. emerges: the relative price of
manufactures falls before World War II and increases afterwards.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: the relative price of manufactures
Annualized % change in the relative price of manufactures
whole sample up to 1939 after 1939 after 1939 while LA > 0:1
(countries with
pre-1939 data)
mean rate of -0.279 -0.161 -0.498 0.011 -0.595
change (%) (2.303) (1.692) (3.142) (2.921) (2.229)
fraction < 0 0.493 0.510 0.462 0.386 0.552
observations 148 96 52 44 125
countries 13 12 8 7 13
Notes: Computed using 5-year moving averages of the variables for period where both price and labor
share data is available. Standard errors in parentheses. The mean rate of change is the mean annualized
% change.
In the light of equation (9), the fact that the average change in the relative price
is slightly below zero suggests that non-agricultural technological change has outpaced
its agricultural counterpart, again echoing the U.S. experience before World War II. It
is also obvious from the third column of Table 2 that in Japan and Korea, where the
move out of agriculture was particularly fast, the relative price of manufacturing goods
plummeted, suggesting that improvements in manufacturing productivity were the main
driver of the process there. These conclusions would hold only more strongly if the change
in the relative price was overstated due to failure of price indices to account for quality
improvements, which arguably are larger for manufactures than for agricultural goods.10
10As discussed in footnote 5, the relationship between labor allocations and relative prices (productivi-
ties) would be diﬀerent in an open economy. Nonetheless, there are two reasons that make us believe that
the close economy assumption is a reasonable approximation for the countries and periods under consid-
eration. First, trade in agricultural products was very limited. For instance, despite being the main grain
exporter in the late 19th century, U.S. grain exports amounted to less than 10% of the quantity produced
(Getreidehandel, -Produktion und -Preise 1907). Second, relative prices do not co-move very much across
countries. While most of the 23 pairwise correlation coeﬃcients for changes in the relative prices that
we can compute are positive, only three are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, and of these only
17In order to explore the determinants of structural change more formally, we regress
the rate of change in the share of labor in agriculture in each country on the log of
the relative price in that country and a country speciﬁc intercept. Empirically, this
speciﬁcation is motivated by the fact that we cannot reject that the agricultural share
follows a random walk with country-speciﬁc drift. Its growth rate and the relative price
are stationary.11 Theoretically, the rate of change of the agricultural labor share is a
function of the aggregate rate of technological change, which is unobserved, and of its
composition, about which the relative price contains information. The country ﬁxed
eﬀects capture the average eﬀect of aggregate technological change at the country level.
This is important since the evidence presented in Table 2 points to important variations in
the speed of structural change across countries. The coeﬃcient on the relative price shows
whether the composition of technological change has an eﬀect on the speed of structural
change. Finally, given our focus on the process of development, we restrict our analysis
to the period where the share of employment in agriculture exceeds one tenth.12 This
approach is preferable to limiting the time period under consideration since it preserves
more observations. The resulting regression equation is
g(L
A
it) = i +  lnpit + it;
where we compute the growth rate of the labor share in agriculture as the annualized
growth rate between two consecutive observations.
A positive coeﬃcient  in this regression implies that decreases in the relative price are
associated with faster than average decreases in the agricultural labor share. A negative
coeﬃcient implies that it is increases in the relative price which are associated with faster
structural change. It then follows from equation (9) that a positive coeﬃcient indicates
that the labor pull channel has a stronger eﬀect on the structural transformation than
two are larger than 0.5. If trade was an important determinant of the relative price (and therefore of the
labor allocation) then we would expect much higher price correlations. The low importance of trade in
agricultural output is in line with what Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2007) document for poor countries
nowadays.
11We use the panel unit root test recommended by Bond, Nauges and Windmeijer (2005) and Hall and
Mairesse (2005), using 10-year lags to maximize the number of observations. Unlike most other panel
unit root tests, this one can be applied to our data despite the somewhat irregular structure that is
unavoidable when combining historical data across countries. The order of integration of the variables
that we ﬁnd could arise if the productivity of each sector is a random walk. The agricultural share could
inherit this property, while the relative price, which depends on the productivity ratio, need not.
12This threshold was reached by the UK as soon as 1891, by Canada in 1951, and by the U.S. in 1955.
18the labor push channel. As discussed above, a negative coeﬃcient leaves several possible
interpretations. While the statistics on changes in the relative price presented in Table 3
contain information on the prevalence and frequency of the two channels, the regression
thus captures additional information on their relative strength.
Table 4 presents the basic regression results. The coeﬃcient on the relative price is
positive and strongly signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations suggesting that in our sample, the
labor pull eﬀect aﬀects the labor allocation more strongly than the labor push eﬀect. In a
model with limited labor mobility, labor reallocation would lag behind the relative price
adjustment. This scenario is explored in the second columm of Table 4, which uses the
lagged log relative price as a regressor. The sign, size, and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient are
essentially unaﬀected by this change. The estimates reported in the third column suggest
that structural change accelerates as the labor share in agriculture falls – this corresponds
to the speeding up of the structural transformation after 1939 that was already visible in
the descriptive statistics in Table 1. Still, the sign of the coeﬃcient on the relative price
is not aﬀected by the introduction of the lagged agricultural share, suggesting once more
that changes in non-agricultural technology have been the main driver behind the process
of structural change in our sample.
These results are robust to changes in the speciﬁcation and in the data selection rules.
First, an interaction of the price and the lagged share is not signiﬁcant. (Results not
reported.) A quantile regression with the same speciﬁcation as column 1 also yields
estimates that barely change across quantiles of the dependent variable. Hence, the
“pull” channel has a stronger eﬀect on the labor share at all stages of the structural
transformation. Results are also robust to the exclusion of individual countries, or to
setting the agricultural share threshold for inclusion in the sample at 5% or at 15%
(instead of 10%).13
The evidence reported in this section suggests that labor pull – increases in non-
agricultural technology – has been the main driver behind the large migrations out of
the agricultural sector that began more than two centuries ago in the UK. First, since
the average change in the relative price in our sample is slightly negative, equation (9)
13An interaction of the relative price with a dummy indicating whether the price is measured as pm=pa
or as py=pa is not signiﬁcant. Nor do results change when splitting the sample along these lines, with the
exception of the relative price losing signiﬁcance in the column 3 speciﬁcation if the price is measured as
py=pa. This is not surprising as the split samples are much smaller.










lagged share of 0.053 
agriculture (0.010)
constant -0.018  -0.019  -0.040 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
R2 0.203 0.120 0.393
observations 125 107 107
countries 13 12 12
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of the labor share in agriculture (average yearly growth
rate between an observation and the previous observation). Variables are 5-year moving averages if data
is at a higher frequency. Only observations where the labor share in agriculture is at least 10% are
included. The regression includes country ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors (clustered at country
level) in parentheses. Stars indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 90% (), 95 () and 99% () level,
respectively. Lagged share of agriculture refers to a ten-year lag.
implies that non-agricultural technological change has marginally outpaced its agricultural
counterpart. Second, our regression analysis complements this result, suggesting that in
pull episodes, labor reallocation occurred at a faster pace than in labor push episodes.
Our results have important implications for modeling the process of structural change.
On the one hand, models of structural change that rely on faster productivity growth in
agriculture, such as Ngai and Pissarides (2007), seem to be at odds with most of the the
pre-World War II evidence. On the other hand, models of structural change that restrict
non-homotheticities in preferences to food consumption, such as Gollin et al. (2002),
seem to miss non-agricultural technological progress as an important driver of structural
change. Finally, our results cast some doubts on some of the policy recommendations
derived using modeling strategies that neglect the crucial role played by non-agricultural
productivity in the process of structural change and economic development.
205 Conclusions
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the role of agriculture in the process of
development and structural change, motivated by the large role agriculture still plays in
today’s poor economies and by its importance for their aggregate productivity. Yet, there
has been and still is a substantial debate about the relative roles played by agricultural
and non-agricultural productivity in the structural transformation out of agriculture. The
goal of this paper was to shed some light on this debate by examining the experience of
countries that completed this transformation.
We presented a simple model consistent with the two crucial observations associated
with the process of structural change: a secular decline in the share of the labor force
devoted to agriculture and a decreasing weight of agricultural output in national product.
We used this framework to explore the theoretical implications of the “labor push” and
“labor pull” hypotheses that point to technological progress in agriculture and manufac-
turing, respectively, as the main driver of structural change. Then, using two data sets
covering the structural transformation of 13 countries that completed that process, we
explored the relative contribution of the two channels to the process of structural change.
This analysis yielded three main results. Firstly, both channels matter. In the case
of the U.S., for instance, the “labor pull” channel dominated before World War I, with
the “labor push” channel taking over after World War II. Secondly, on average, increases
in non-agricultural productivity played a slightly larger role than those in agricultural
productivity, pointing to the “labor pull” channel as a somewhat more important engine
of structural change overall. Finally, we found that the agricultural labor share declined
more when the productivity of manufacturing increased relative to that of agriculture.
Overall, while the “labor push” channel matters at times, this evidence indicates that the
“labor pull” channel was the main engine behind the massive reallocations of labor out of
agriculture that began in the UK more than two centuries ago.
Our results are a crucial input for the growing theoretical work on structural change
and may have important implications for the understanding and design of adequate de-
velopment policies.
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A Basic results under CES preferences






















; ; > 0; > 0;
where cA
t and cM
t denote individual consumption of food and non-agricultural goods re-
spectively,  is the relative weight of non-agricultural goods in preferences and  is the



























CES(0;M;A) = G(1); LM
t < 0: (11)
On the one hand, the labor pull hypothesis requires CES
M > 0 which implies that











, the labor push hypothesis requires that  > 1 is not too
large.14. If these two restrictions on the degree of substitutability between agricultural
and non-agricultural goods hold, then all the results presented in Section 2 are valid under
this preference speciﬁcation that abstracts from . In addition, as in Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) diﬀerential productivity growth across sectors results in structural change even
when the last source of non-homotheticity,  = 0, is removed.15 The intuition for this
result is as follows. If the elasticity of substitution  is above 1, an increase in M reduces
the price of the non-agricultural good, and since both goods are good substitutes, induces
a more than proportional increase in its demand that leads to a reallocation of labor to
the non-agricultural sector. An increase in agricultural productivity reduces the price











t ) > 0 This inequality holds for
suﬃciently small values of  > 1.
15Nonetheless, when  = 0, only the labor pull hypothesis would be consistent with the path of
migrations observed in the data. This is because our restrictions on  imply that an increase in agricultural
productivity leads to an increase in the share of labor employed in this sector.
22of food, causing opposing income and substitution eﬀects. The substitution eﬀect tends
to raise food demand, while the income eﬀect implies a reduced food expenditure share
because the income elasticity of food is less than one. Our second restriction on the size
of v ensures that the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect and therefore an
increase in A is associated with a reduction in the agricultural labor force.
B Data sources
See Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: Historical data: sources and deﬁnitions
country Share of employment Relative price
in agriculture
Belgium Mitchell (2003, Table B1) Price indices for agricultural output and for total output, imputed
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre Historical
National Accounts Database (Smits, Woltjer and Ma 2009), which
for Belgium mainly draws on Horlings (1996)
Canada Historical Statistics of
Canada series #D1_7
General Wholesale Price Index, Fully and chieﬂy manufactured,
and Wholesale Price Index of Canadian farm products, Statistics
Canadaa
Finland Mitchell (2003, Table B1) Price indices for agricultural output and for total output, imputed
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre Historical
National Accounts Database (Smits et al. 2009), which for Finland
draws on Hjerppe (1989, 1996)
France Mitchell (2003, Table B1) Price indices for agricultural output and for total output, imputed
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre Historical
National Accounts Database (Smits et al. 2009), which for France
draws on Toutain (1987)
Germany 1871: Statistisches
Jahrbuch für das Deutsche
Reich (1974 [1880]), 1882-
1939: Mitchell (2003,
Table B1)
Wholesale price indices for agriculture and manufacturing, Jacobs
and Richter (1935)
aFarm products index constructed by linking two indices (1890-1934 and 1926-1970).
23country Share of employment Relative price
in agriculture
Italy Mitchell (2003, Table B1) Wholesale price index and Bread and Flour price index, Fenoaltea
(2002, Table A.1)
Japan Mitchell (1998) 1874-1939: Price index of agricultural products and of manufac-
turing, Choki Keizai Tokei (Estimates of Long-Term Economic
Statistics of Japan Since 1868) (1967);a 1960-1980: Domestic Cor-
porate Goods Price Index and Agricultural Price Index, Statistics
Bureaub
Netherlands Smits, Horlings and van
Zanden (2000)
Price indices for agricultural output and for total output, imputed
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre Historical
National Accounts Database (Smits et al. 2009), which for the
Netherlands draws on various sources, in particular Smits et al.
(2000)
South Korea Mitchell (1998) Producer price indices for agriculture and manufacturing, South
Korean National Agricultural Cooperative Federationc
Spain Mitchell (2003, Table B1) Price indices for agricultural output and for total output, imputed
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre Historical
National Accounts Database (Smits et al. 2009), which for Spain
draws on Prados de la Escosura (2003)





Price indices for agricultural output and for total output, im-
puted from Swedish Historical National Accounts, compiled by
Olle Krantz and Lennart Schön, available in Lund University
Macroeconomic and Demographic Database http://www.ehl.
lu.se/database/LU-MADD/National%20Accounts/default.htm
UK Clark (2002, Table 3) Price indices for Principal Industrial Products and for Agricultural
Products, Mitchell (1988)
USA 1800-1900: Weiss (1992,
1993), 1910-2000: U.S.
Department of Commerce
(1975, series D5 and D6);
Dennis and Iscan (2009)
1800-1913: Wholesale price indices for all commodities and for
farm products (series E52 and E53), U.S. Department of Com-
merce (1975, Warren and Pearson series), Hanes (1998);d 1913-
1954: Wholesale price indices for industrial commodities and for
farm goods, U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, series E23,
E25); 1954-2001: Producer price indices for farm products and
industrial commodities, Council of Economic Advisers (2002, Ta-
ble B-67); Dennis and Iscan (2009)
aPages 165, 195, 197, 200, 203, 207.
bStatistical Survey Department, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications.
Tables 22-1 and 22-10. Downloaded from http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/index.htm.
cData downloaded from http://kosis.nso.go.kr.
dHanes extended the series to 1860-1990 using the same method underlying the Warren and Pearson
indices.
24Table 6: Data coverage
country share of employment relative price
in agriculture
period observations period observations
Belgium 1846 - 1946 10 1835 - 1953 107
Canada 1881 - 1970 12 1890 - 1970 81
Finland 1880 - 2000 12 1860 - 2001 142
France 1856 - 1936 11 1815 - 1938 118
Germany 1871 - 1939 7 1792 - 1913 122
Italy 1871 - 1971 10 1861 - 1914 54
Japan 1872 - 1990 14 1874 - 2004 59
Netherlands 1800 - 1913 114 1807 - 1939 121
South Korea 1955 - 2006 46 1965 - 2006 42
Spain 1860 - 2001 13 1850 - 1958 109
Sweden 1850 - 2000 151 1800 - 2000 201
UK 1800 - 1930 14 1800 - 1900 101
USA 1800 - 2000 103 1800 - 2000 201
C The measure of the manufacturing price
For some countries where no measure of the price of manufacturing goods is available, we
use the GDP deﬂator relative to the price of agricultural goods. This Appendix shows
that this measure changes with changes in relative productivity of the two sectors in the
same way as the ideal relative price would.
For this, ﬁrst derive the correct consumption-based aggregate price index. With non-
homothetic preferences, this requires some precision because the marginal expenditure
needed to raise by one unit is not constant and therefore does not coincide with the
average expenditure per unit of utility. (This distinguishes this setup from e.g. a setup
with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, where such a consumption-based price index is often used,
and where the two concepts coincide.)
Let P be the marginal expenditure needed to raise utility by one unit beyond  u and




s.t.  ln(ca   ) + ln(cm + ) =  u:





































Clearly, ln(P=pa) varies proportionally with ln(pm=pa).
Obtain  P by evaluating the objective function at the optimum:
 P = pmcm + paca = (1 + )P   pm + pa (14)
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   = cm;
which is strictly positive for all countries in the data.
Hence, py=pa moves in the same direction as pm=pa no matter whether the historical
price indices we use measure average or marginal expenditure. As a result, while it is not
legitimate to compare levels of indices between countries using pm vs py, within-country
changes in the relative price reﬂect changes in pm=pa, and thus changes in the sectoral
productivities, no matter whether they are measured using pm or py.
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